Asymmetric industrial energy prices and international trade by Sato, Misato & Dechezlepretre, Antoine
  
Misato Sato and Antoine Dechezleprêtre 
Asymmetric industrial energy prices and 
international trade 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Sato, Misato and Dechezlepretre, Antoine (2015) Asymmetric industrial energy prices and 
international trade. Energy Economics. ISSN 0140-9883  
 
DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2015.08.020] 
 
Reuse of this item is permitted through licensing under the Creative Commons: 
 
© 2015 Elsevier B.V  
CC BY 4.0  
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/63634/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: Online: September 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. You may freely distribute the URL 
(http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
 
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Asymmetric industrial energy prices 
and international trade* 
Misato Sato†	and Antoine Dechezleprêtre‡ 
 
Abstract 
This paper measures the response of bilateral trade flows to differences in 
industrial energy prices across countries. Using a panel for the period 1996-
2011 including 42 countries, 62 sectors and covering 60% of global 
merchandise trade, we estimate the short-run effects of sector-level energy 
price asymmetry on trade. We find that changes in relative energy prices have 
a statistically significant but very small impact on imports. On average, a 10% 
increase in the energy price difference between two country-sectors 
increases imports by 0.2%. The impact is larger for energy-intensive sectors. 
Even in these sectors however, the magnitude of the effect is such that 
changes in energy price differences across time explain less than 0.01% of the 
variation in trade flows. Simulations based on our model predict that a €40-
65/tCO2 price of carbon in the EU ETS would increase Europe’s imports from 
the rest of the world by less than 0.05% and decrease exports by 0.2%. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Do higher energy prices cause sectors to lose industrial export competitiveness? 
The rising price of energy remains a politically sensitive issue, particularly in energy 
import dependent regions such as Europe and Japan. Several new trends contribute 
to this: the slow recovery since the 2008 financial crisis, the shale gas boom in the 
US with the consequent fall in energy prices for US manufacturers, the costly 
transition from fossil fuel and nuclear to renewable energy sources notably in 
Europe, and the increased competition from emerging economies. Standard trade 
models predict that by making domestic production more costly, policies that 
increase energy price will put domestic firms at a strategic disadvantage relative to 
foreign rivals facing lower energy prices. This result forms the basis of the so-called 
Pollution Haven Hypothesis (Taylor & Copeland, 2004; Levinson & Taylor, 2008), 
which postulates that uneven environmental policies influence the distribution of 
polluting industries between countries. According to this theory, producers of 
energy intensive products respond to higher energy prices by producing fewer 
energy-intensive goods which may lead to a decline in net exports and the partial 
relocation of production to a region with low energy prices (Hanna, 2010). However, 
energy costs are only one of many factors that influence imports and relocation. 
These include labor costs, infrastructures, institutions, proximity to customers, and 
many others (Demailly & Quirion, 2008). For this reason, the extent to which 
changes in relative energy prices might influence trade and competitiveness is 
unclear and is partly an empirical question. The objective of this paper is to 
determine the magnitude of this impact using historical data on trade and energy 
prices from 1996 to 2011 covering 42 countries and 62 sectors representing 60% of 
global merchandise trade during that period. 
The question of whether trade has historically responded to energy price 
differences remains largely unanswered empirically. As a consequence, our 
understanding of the impact of regional asymmetries in carbon prices on trade is 
limited, as is our understanding of the environmental efficacy of such policies. Yet, 
as countries implement carbon pricing policies at different speeds, there is 
considerable interest in assessing the potential trade impacts of climate change 
mitigation policies, particularly for energy intensive trade-exposed sectors. The 
literature on the links between climate policy and international trade1 and in 
particular on “carbon leakage” (whether part of the emissions reductions achieved 
by a carbon emissions reduction policy is directly offset by an increase in emissions 
outside of the regulated region) has so far relied on ex-ante model simulation 
                                                        
1 See Levinson & Taylor (2008); Levinson (2010) ; Copeland & Taylor (2003); Jaffe et al. (1995); 
Jeppesen et al. (2002) for reviews of the wider literature on effects of environmental policies on 
trade. 
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strategies, typically using CGE models2 (e.g. Babiker, 2005; Burniaux & Martins, 
2000; Gerlagh & Kuik, 2007; Kuik & Gerlagh, 2003; Paltsev, 2001) or partial 
equilibrium analysis in the context of the EU ETS3 (e.g. Demailly & Quirion, 2008; 
Monjon & Quirion, 2009; Demailly & Quirion, 2006; Hourcade et al., 2007) but the 
results are decisively mixed, highlighting the need for empirical analysis in order to 
better understand the nature and magnitude of these effects. The lack of empirical 
evidence may be attributable to several factors. Firstly, although carbon mitigation 
policies targeting industry sector emissions have recently proliferated across the 
world – including the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), New 
Zealand’s ETS, the UK’s Climate Change Levy, California’s climate programme, 
British Columbia’s carbon tax scheme and China’s pilot emissions trading schemes – 
the nascent nature of the majority of schemes means there is a lack of observed data. 
An exception is the Kyoto protocol which was ratified in 1997. Aichele & Felbermayr 
(2012) derive a gravity equation for the carbon content of trade and find that 
commitment to the Kyoto protocol is associated with a decrease in domestic 
emissions by 7%, but also with an increase in the share of imported embodied 
carbon emissions over domestic emissions by about 14%. Using a matching method, 
Aichele & Felbermayr (2011) finds that Kyoto countries’ exports are reduced by 
14% compared to a counterfactual scenario. However, since the paper uses country-
level data a concern is that the Kyoto dummy variable also captures other macro-
economic shocks correlated with both exports and Kyoto ratification, such as 
China’s accession to the WTO in 2002 (Branger & Quirion, 2013). Secondly, where 
carbon prices have existed, the levels have been low, preventing researchers from 
disentangling the effect of small carbon prices from the multitude of more dominant 
factors that drive trade and investment decisions, such as exchange rates, transport 
costs, trade agreements, and relative costs of labour, capital and other input costs. 
Thirdly, it is difficult to compare the relative stringency of existing carbon pricing 
policies in a meaningful way. Complications arise, for example, in the EU ETS where 
allowances were allocated for free to most sectors in the first two implementing 
phases. 
This paper aims to overcome these limitations and to establish whether changes in 
energy price differences between trading partners affect trade flows between these 
                                                        
2 See Dröge (2009) and Zhou et al. (2010) for a review of this literature. This group of studies 
simulate different emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol and have estimated a wide 
range of carbon leakage rates. 
3 These studies examine the potential impacts of climate policies on trade and investment for heavy 
industry and highlight sectoral differences in carbon leakage rates estimated in these models reflect 
the differences in parameters such as carbon intensity of production, abatement potential, ability to 
pass through abatement costs to consumers, as well as different levels of sensitivity to multiple 
barriers of trade (e.g. product differentiation, service differentiation, transport costs, capacity 
constraints and import restrictions). Higher carbon leakage rates are estimated for the steel sector 
which exhibit high product differentiation but also higher abatement potential, relative to the cement 
sector, which is characterised by homogeneous products but high transport costs relative to value. 
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countries, based on a large dataset covering 42 countries at varying levels of 
economic development (over 1600 country pairs) and 62 sectors for the period 
1996 to 2011. Contrary to the stringency of climate change regulations, energy 
prices have the advantage of being comparable across countries, sectors and time, 
and to be available for a large set of countries and a long time period. Following Aldy 
& Pizer (2011), we postulate that historic asymmetries in industrial energy prices 
offer insights into the impact of asymmetric carbon prices in the future, owing to the 
fact that carbon prices work by increasing the effective price of energy for industry. 
The analysis is conducted at the sector level, allowing us to control for country-level 
macroeconomic shocks and for factors that affect bilateral trade and might be 
correlated with energy price differences, such as exchange rates, transport costs, 
trade agreements, and relative labour costs. The richness of the data allows us to 
include a large range of country, sector and time fixed effects, thereby purging the 
estimates from a range of potential confounding factors. 
This paper contributes to a small recent literature which seeks to empirically 
examine the relationship between historic energy prices and trade. Aldy & Pizer 
(2011) focus on the US and use historical variation in industrial electricity price 
across states to investigate its effect on sectoral production and consumption. This 
enables an empirical investigation of the impact of carbon pricing on US industrial 
supply and demand, despite the absence of carbon pricing in the US historically. 
They show that an increase in energy prices in the US following the introduction of a 
15$/ton carbon tax would induce a domestic production decline of between 3 and 4 
percent among energy-intensive sectors and a roughly 1 percent increase in imports. 
The authors also find evidence that responses to energy prices are bigger for 
industries with higher energy intensity. Gerlagh & Mathys (2011) use a country 
specific energy abundance measure to proxy for marginal energy costs, and 
investigate its impact on net exports using a panel of 14 high income (OECD) 
countries over 28 years. The authors find that there is high correlation between 
energy abundance and price, and that energy abundant countries have a high level 
of energy embodied in exports relative to imports. These results therefore provide 
support to the existence of a carbon leakage effect. Our paper builds on these 
studies, using a much wider dataset, covering 62 sectors in 42 countries over 15 
years. 
We find evidence that a widening of the energy price gap has a statistically 
significant but small effect on bilateral exports: a 10% increase in the energy price 
gap between two countries within a given sector translates on average into a 0.2% 
increase in imports. This result is robust across a wide range of alternative model 
specifications and estimators. Consistent with expectations, we find that energy 
price differences have a larger impact on trade in energy-intensive sectors. However, 
even in these sectors the impact is small. Overall, energy price differences across 
time explain less than 0.01% of the variation in trade flows, suggesting that 
differences in energy prices are a marginal driver of trade globally. 
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We also use our estimates to conduct policy simulations and evaluate the degree to 
which stricter carbon pricing policies in Europe would affect trade patterns. Our 
results suggest that a €40-65/tCO2 price of carbon in the EU ETS would increase 
Europe’s imports from the rest of the world by around 0.04% and decrease exports 
by 0.2%. To put things into perspective, consider that imports from European 
countries have grown at an average annual rate of 6.5% between 1995 and 2011 
and at the rate of 15.6% since 2009. Hence, the impact of higher EU ETS prices on 
European imports would appear to be small compared with other drivers of trade. 
This paper has important policy implications. It suggests that concerns about carbon 
leakage are not unfounded but may have been largely overplayed. While efforts to 
price carbon are spreading globally, governments are consistently pressured to 
compensate energy intensive trade-exposed sectors, because of the assumed 
adverse impacts of climate change policies on their export competitiveness. 
European industries actively lobby for continued free allocation of permits within 
the EU ETS and in the US, proposals to use output-based allocation for the upcoming 
emission trading schemes are also justified on fear of leakage effects, although 
subsidising output reduces efficiency of the overall system as it shields product 
prices from the real cost of carbon (Fischer & Fox, 2007; Hepburn et al., 2006). Our 
results suggest that, although energy price differences have some impact on trade, 
the magnitude of this effect is small, in particular when compared to other factors 
affecting trade relationships. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our conceptual 
framework and empirical strategy. The data is described in Section 3. Section 4 
reports and discusses the empirical results and the magnitude of the effect. In 
Section 5 we use our estimations results to simulate the impact of a higher carbon 
price in the EU ETS on European imports and exports. The final section offers some 
concluding remarks. 
2 Conceptual framework and empirical strategy  
2.1 Conceptual framework 
A large theoretical literature has investigated the consequences of unequal 
environmental regulatory stringency on trade and competitiveness. Most models 
consider a local pollutant that is emitted during the production process of the final 
good and pollution emissions taxes imposed to reduce polluting emissions, but the 
framework equally applies to energy or carbon taxes implemented to reduce carbon 
emissions. Standard models predict that by making domestic production more 
costly, policies that increase energy price will put domestic firms at a strategic 
disadvantage relative to foreign rivals if companies are competing with foreign 
counterparts with lower energy prices. This results forms the basis of the so- called 
Pollution Haven Hypothesis (Taylor & Copeland, 2004; Levinson & Taylor, 2008). 
For producers of energy intensive products, higher energy prices could increase 
marginal production costs considerably. Depending on the degree to which they can 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
pass the increased costs onto the consumer (i.e. the degree of competition they face) 
and on the magnitude and persistence of the energy price difference vis-a-vis their 
competitors, they may respond by producing fewer energy-intensive goods, which 
may lead to a decline in net exports and the partial relocation of production to a 
region with low energy prices (Hanna, 2010).4  
It is easy to see that in a model where two countries are identical except for 
differences in environmental policy (or energy taxes), the country with weaker 
policy will specialise in the production of the polluting good, and export that good to 
the “virtuous” country. In practice, however, many factors influence production 
costs, including labor costs, infrastruc- tures, institutions, and proximity to 
customers (Demailly & Quirion, 2008). Hence, only if environmental costs dominate 
these other costs would one expect a change in relative environmental policy 
stringency to induce some relocation of activities (Copeland & Taylor, 2003). 
Another possibility is that even if marginal production costs increase, producers 
may be able to pass on the increase in energy prices to their consumers because of 
high transport costs or product differentiation from imports such that their trade 
and investment decisions are unaffected by rising energy costs. The Porter 
hypothesis (Porter, 1991; Porter & van der Linde, 1995) even asserts that 
environmental regulations, by inducing firms to innovate in new pollution-control 
technologies, might have a positive impact on productivity and profitability, which 
may increase firms’ export competitiveness. Hence, understanding the relationship 
between changes in relative energy prices and trade is partly an empirical question. 
2.2 Empirical approach 
In this paper we estimate the reduced-form short-term effects of energy price 
differences on bilateral trade at the sector level. Relative industrial energy prices 
affect trade flows through the induced change in relative production costs between 
trading partners. Because carbon prices work by increasing the effective cost of 
energy for industry, the results can be used to infer the effects of potential 
asymmetries in carbon price on future trade patterns5, with the obvious limitation 
that it is not possible to simulate the impact of carbon price differences larger than 
what has been observed in the past. This is useful because while experience with 
carbon prices is still limited globally, historic data on industrial energy prices exists 
for many countries and many years. Moreover, Sato et al. (2015) show that most of 
the variation in energy price differences between countries comes from variation in 
energy taxes. Hence, energy price differences reflect differences in energy and 
carbon policies between countries. 
                                                        
4 In a general equilibrium framework, sectors unaffected by pollution taxes then benefit from factor 
reallocation and could then see an increase in net exports. 
5 This is because the level of carbon emissions are largely attributable to energy combustion in 
production (although in some processes, there are non-energy related emissions also such as process 
emissions in cement production). 
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We use a gravity framework and, in line with the recent empirical trade literature, 
we estimate the gravity equation in its multiplicative form (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 
2006). Since the value of trade between two countries in any period is a non-
negative integer, it is natural to model the conditional mean as a log-link function of 
explanatory factors and use a Poisson maximum likelihood estimator.6 Our 
empirical model is: 

= 	
 + 	
	 + 	 + 	
	
+ 	 + 
	 + 	 + 	(1) 
where importsijst is the value of annual imports by country i from country j for 
sector s at time t and vijst is the error term. Our main variable of interest, the 
difference in energy price between two trading partners, is defined as epgapijst-1 
which is the difference in the logs of energy prices, or in other words the log of the 
ratio of energy prices: 
epgapijst-1 = ln(Epist-1) ln(Epjst-1) 
where Epist-1 and Epjst-1 are the real industrial energy price respectively in country 
i and j in sector s at time t-1. A positive value of epgapijst-1 implies that the importer 
i has a higher industrial energy price than the exporter. We lag prices by a year to 
reflect delayed response and also mitigate contemporaneous feedback effects. The 
primary objective of the study is to estimate the coefficient 	. 
The choice of control variables is derived from recent advances in the gravity 
literature. First, we control for overall bilateral economic size, relative economic 
size (similarity of GDP) as well as differences in relative factor endowments 
(similarity of capital-labour ratios) (Baltagi et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2010; Egger, 
2000). These three variables are specified as follows: 
 = 	( + ) 
 =  1 −   + 

−   + 
  
                                                        
6 Non-linear models initially developed for count data analysis can be successfully applied to 
continuous variables such as trade data (Wooldridge, 2010). Studies have shown that log-
linearised models estimated by OLS can be inefficient and biased where the data is 
heteroskedastic (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006), as is often the case with bilateral trade data. 
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 = ! " #$%&$'−   #$%&$! 
 
Overall bilateral economic size reflects the fact that the volume of exports should be 
higher, the bigger the overall market size. gdpsimijt measures the similarity in the 
levels of GDP in the trading partners, hence captures the relative size of the two 
trading partners. Before the log-linear transformation, this variable can take the 
value between 0 and 0.5. A higher value indicates that the two trading partners are 
similar in size (GDP), with 0.5 indicating equal country size. Theory predicts that the 
higher this value, the greater the expected share of inter-industry trade (Egger, 
2000). r f acijt measures the similarity in capital-labour ratios, or in other words, the 
relative factor endowments. A value of 0 represents equal factor endowments 
proportion. Bergstrand (1990) illustrates empirically using the gravity model that 
bilateral trade between high income countries is positively related to similarity in 
relative factor endowments (reflecting similarity in preferences). In addition, we 
control for two idiosyncratic factors that might be correlated with energy price 
differences: the country-pair-sector specific difference in wages and the country 
pair specific real effective exchange rate ratio defined as follows: 
wagegapijst = ln(wageist) ln(wagejst) 
reerratioijt = ln(reerit) ln(reerjt) 
where wageist and wagejst are the average real wage in country i and j in sector s in 
year t expressed in current USD and reerit and reerjt are the real effective exchange 
rates in country i and j at time t against the US dollar. A positive value of wagegapijst 
implies that the importer i has a higher real wage price than the exporter. The FDI 
and industry location literature, as well as the trade literature have examined the 
role of labour price differentials in international trade patterns and found mixed 
evidence on their effect (Baltagi et al., 2007). Exchange rate dynamics have also 
been explored as a possible determinant of international trade decisions Egger & 
Egger (2005). 
As is common with trade data, the sectoral trade data used in this analysis displays 
strong persistence. Thus it is important to account for trade in past periods, by 
including lags of the dependent variable. Lagged dependent variables enter as ∑ ()	 , where n is the number of lags. We experimented with different 
values of n and use n = 3 in our baseline specification for the reason that the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variables becomes statistically insignificant 
from n = 4 onwards, but we test the sensitivity of our results to this choice. 
To minimise the possibility of biases due to omitted variables, our model includes 
country- pair-sector fixed effects , to control for time invariant country pair-
specific determinants (such as distance, common language, common borders, 
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common currency, colonial ties) but also for sector specific characteristics such as 
product differentiation, market structure, transportation costs and trade intensity. 
2.3 Dynamic count data models with fixed effects 
Accounting both for dynamics and fixed effects in count data models raises a 
number of issues. Introducing lagged dependent variables violates the strict 
exogeneity assumption which makes the Hausman et al. (1984) fixed effect method 
(the count data equivalent to the within groups estimator) unsuitable as it requires 
strict exogeneity. To simultaneously account for fixed effects and lagged dependent 
variables we use the pre-sample mean count data estimator introduced by Blundell 
et al. (1999) and Blundell et al. (2002), who suggest conditioning on the pre-sample 
average of the dependent variable to proxy out the fixed effect. Applications to 
environmental issues include Jug & Mirza (2005) and Egger et al. (2011). The pre-
sample mean estimator requires long pre-sample history of realisations of the 
dependant variable and is thus particularly suitable to the study of trade data. 
Because the pre-sample average of the dependent variable may fail to capture every 
aspect of time- invariant country-pair heterogeneity, we include standard gravity 
variables (including the log of population-weighted geographical distance, 
contiguity, common official language and common currency) as well as importer, 
exporter and sector dummy variables. The inclusion of this large set of dummy 
variables combined with the skewed distribution of the dependent variable poses 
computational problems to which the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) 
estimator developed by Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) offers an attractive solution. 
Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) show that the model can provide a consistent 
estimator of bilateral trade in gravity models. However, we check the robustness of 
our results to the use of alternative estimators. 
3 Data and descriptive statistics  
3.1 Data 
This paper brings together a variety of datasets to determine the impact of relative 
energy prices on trade. Our panel covers 42 countries (including high, middle and 
low income) and 62 sectors for the period 1996 to 2011. The data is disaggregated 
at 2-digit sector resolution using SITC Revision 3 (see Appendix B for a list of 
countries and sectors). The energy price data can only be disaggregated at a broader 
level, and we have prices for 12 sectors incorporating the 62 sectors at which the 
analysis is carried out. 
Bilateral trade data 
Bilateral trade data is taken from the CEPII’s BACI database7 which contains detailed 
bilateral import and export statistics from the UN Commodity Trade (COMTRADE) 
database. Although the trade data is available at a more granular level, the chosen 
level reflects a trade-off between several considerations. A finer level of sector 
                                                        
7 http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=1 
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disaggregation can be advantageous particularly for heterogeneous sectors, 
enabling to control for sub-sector specific characteristics. However, moving to the 
three or four-digit level substantially increases the number of zero or missing values 
in the dependent variable and results in a very skewed distribution. At 62 sector 
level, there are no observations with zero or missing trade, and the share of 
observations where the trade in value is very small (less than 0.01 million USD) is 
around 5%, which is manageable for the estimation techniques used. 
Depending on the year, the bilateral trade data in the sample covers between 55 and 
65% of world trade obtained from the WTO Statistics Database (World Trade 
Organisation, 2012). Exports (in value terms) on an aggregate level rose steadily 
during the 1990s decade from $3,515 billion USD in 1991 to $6,494 billion in 2002. 
It then increased at a faster rate until disrupted by the financial crisis and 
subsequent economic recession in 2008, when world exports fell sharply (dropping 
from $16,140 billion to $12,542 billion between 2008 and 2009). Since 2009, 
aggregate exports have been on an upward trend again, reaching $18,255 billion in 
2011. 
Energy prices 
We use a unique and comprehensive dataset of industrial energy prices indices at 
the country and sector level covering 48 countries and 12 industry sectors, 
constructed in Sato et al. (2015). This sector level energy price index covers four key 
types of fuel carriers (electricity, gas, coal and oil), provides greater coverage of 
sectors, countries and years than previously available energy price data, and is 
constructed using a consistent and transparent method. The energy price index for a 
given sector s in country i in year t is constructed by weighting fuel prices for four 
carriers (oil, gas, coal and electricity) by the consumption of each fuel type in that 
sector-country (si) (see Appendix A for more detail on the construction of the price 
index). This method addresses the important issue of heterogenous fuel mix 
observed across sectors and countries and the index hence captures the change in 
energy price level (including taxes) over time for a specific country-sector. This is 
useful because data on energy prices faced by different industrial sectors are hard to 
obtain for most countries, while energy price for electricity generation and 
households are readily available. For most OECD countries, industrial energy prices 
are published only at the country level (averaged across all industrial sectors) 
rather than for individuals sectors, and often with considerable missing data points. 
The energy price index uses fixed fuel weights (representing fuel consumption in 
2005) over time hence captures the within-sector variation, and uses transparent 
and consistent methods to reduce missing data-points as documented in Sato et al. 
(2015). The fuel prices are transformed into logs before applying the fuel weights 
hence the resulting energy price index is not expressed in monetary units.8 A 
                                                        
8 It is important for econometric analysis to keep the weights fixed so that the only variation in the 
price variable comes from underlying variations in energy prices. This makes the interpretation of 
the coefficient straightforward and prevents some potential endogeneity issues. The results are 
robust however to using time-varying weights (see section 4.4). 
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version of the energy price in USD/TOE terms using time-varying fuel weights – 
hence corresponding to observed energy prices faced by industry – also available 
from Sato et al. (2015) is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Cross-country differences in the energy prices (including tax) for 
average industry, for 10 sample countries 
 
Source: Sato et al. (2015) Note: The panels show the country level variable weights price level (in 
2010$) based on market exchange rates. BRA=Brazil, CAN=Canada, FRA=France, IDN=Indonesia, 
IND=India, ITA=Italy, JPN=Japan, KOR=South Korea, MEX=Mexico 
The price index uses industrial energy price data from the IEA Energy End-Use 
Prices database (IEA, 2012a) as the primary source of fuel price data for industrial 
sectors. This represents the final industrial energy prices including taxes paid by 
industry for different fuels and excluding VAT and recoverable taxes and levies and 
is expressed in real terms (underlying prices are net of inflation).9 The sector level 
fuel consumption data is taken from the IEA World Energy Balances (IEA, 2012a). It 
is important to note that this industrial energy price index represents an 
approximation of the true prices paid by each sector and may not be the true prices, 
for example because some countries offer tax exemptions and other subsidies to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
9 The IEA defines the published industrial energy prices as “the average of amounts paid for the 
industrial and manufacturing sectors” and “include transport costs to the consumer; are prices 
actually paid (i.e. net of rebates) and; include taxes which have to be paid by the consumer as part of 
the transaction and which are not refundable. This excludes value added tax (VAT) paid in many 
European countries by industry (including electric power stations) and commercial end-users for all 
goods and services (including energy). In these cases VAT is refunded to the customer, usually in the 
form of a tax credit. Therefore, it is not included in the prices and taxes columns in the tables.” (IEA, 
2012b). 
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energy users. However, in the absence of comprehensive data on observed energy 
price data at the sector level, it provides a good alternative solution. 
There has historically been considerable variation in industrial energy prices across 
countries as shown in Figure 1. In 2001, prices were below 600US$/TOE in the USA, 
South Korea, India, Indonesia and France, but were twice as high in Italy and Japan. 
While real industrial energy prices remained relatively unchanged over the next 
decade (below 800US$/TOW in 2008) for Canada, South Korea, USA, India and 
Indonesia, in contrast, prices tended to rise for Italy, France, Mexico, Brazil and 
Japan but went down in Canada and India. As a consequence, there has been 
considerable variation across time in energy price differences that we can exploit in 
our empirical setting. 
Other data 
GDP and population data are obtained form the International Monetary Fund’s 
World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2012).10 GDP data are available in US$ in current 
prices. These are converted into real prices using the GDP deflator index, which is 
also available from the same database. Because the latter has different base years 
for different countries, we adjust the deflator index, using 2005 as the baseline for 
all countries. 
Data on wages were obtained from United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (2011). It was constructed by deflating nominal annual wage by sector 
using a GDP deflator variable from the World Bank, then converting to constant US 
dollars (2005) using exchange rate data from UNIDO. Data on the real effective 
exchange rates (reer) are taken from Darvas (2012). Finally, standard gravity model 
variables are obtained from the Gravity Dataset provided by CEPII (CEPII, 2012). 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Notes: These are the values from our regression sample of 348771 observations 
across 64763 country pair sectors, between 2001 and 2011. 
                                                        
10 For Taiwan, GDP data was obtained from Taiwan national statistics (National Statistics of Republic 
of China (Taiwan), 2012). 
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3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for our estimation sample are provided in Table 1. At the 
country-pair- sector level, there is considerable variation in exports as shown in the 
first row. With a mean of $112 million, bilateral exports at sector level range from 
zero up to over $97 billion. More variation comes from the sector heterogeneity (in 
trade intensity and value) than from the bilateral-pair heterogeneity. 
The variation in the energy price gap variable is shown in the second row of Table 1. 
The mean is zero because of the symmetrical nature of the data – the energy price 
gap between US and UK is expressed as a negative value when considering UK 
imports to the US, and as a positive value of the same magnitude when considering 
US imports to the UK. The within-group standard deviation of the energy price ratio 
is high, suggesting that historical fluctuations in the energy price gap, due not to 
climate policies but to underlying factors (e.g. energy taxes, energy supply and 
demand), have been considerable. 
As Table 1 shows, the between country-pair-sectors variation is greater than the 
within variation for all variables, highlighting the importance of using panel data to 
control for heterogeneity across country-pairs and sectors. 
4 Regression results  
4.1 All sectors 
Table 2 presents our main estimation results. We construct the pre-sample mean of 
the dependent variable over the years 1996 to 200011 and estimate over the period 
2001-2011 using Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood. 
Column (1) shows that the coefficient on the lagged (tax inclusive) energy price gap 
is positive and significant. This result is robust to controlling for the wage difference 
between countries i and j (column 2), for the exchange rate (column 3), and for both 
(column 4). The elasticity of 0.021 implies that a 10% higher energy price gap is 
associated with about 0.21% more imports. The control variables have signs that 
are consistent with expectations. We find that the use of a dynamic panel estimator 
is important, as the coefficients for the lagged dependent variables always exhibit a 
parameter estimate which is significantly different from zero. This suggests that 
there is indeed strong ’think-back’ or ’stickiness’ in the level of sectoral trade 
between two countries as found in recent literature (Olivero & Yotov, 2010, 2012). 
Increases in total economic mass increases bilateral exports, and the similarity in  
                                                        
11  Using 5 years of data to construct the pre-sample mean is arbitrary and driven by a trade-off 
between the length of the pre-sample period and the size of the estimation sample. On the one hand, 
one would use as many years as possible to construct the pre-sample average. On the other hand, as 
the trade data only starts in 2005, any additional year used to construct the pre-sample average 
mechanically reduces the size of our estimation sample. We tested the sensitivity of our results to 
using a pre-sample period of 4, 5 and 6 years, and find that this makes almost no change to the 
results. 
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Table 2: Results for all sectors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: *,**,***= significant at 10,% 5%, 1%. Standard errors clustered at the country pair 
level in parentheses. The dependent variable is the value of annual bilateral imports in 
all columns. Estimation is by Poisson pseudo- maximum likelihood. The country-pair-
sector fixed effect is a pre-sample mean of the dependent variable over the years 1996-
2000. All regressions include controls for relative factor endowments, overall economic 
size of the two trading partners, GDP similarity, population weighted distance between 
the trading partners, and dummies for common currency, contiguity and common official 
language. All regressions include dummies for years, importer, exporter, and sectors. 
Column (2) and (4) also controls for wage differences, and columns (3) and (4) control 
for the real effective exchange rates ratio (reer). 
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GDP also tends to increase trade. The positive coefficient on the latter suggests 
existence of intra-industry trade. The coefficient on r f acijt is negative, suggesting 
that bilateral trade is negatively related to differences in relative factor endowments, 
in line with the Linder hypothesis. The real exchange rate ratio is positive and 
significant, suggesting that real exchange rate dynamics is an important 
determinant of bilateral trade flows. The coefficient on the wage gap is not 
statistically different from zero. At least two reasons can explain this surprising 
finding. First, the data is only available at a broad sectoral aggregation level (22 
sectors) and the resulting measurement error should lead to attenuation bias, which 
may explain why the point estimate is so close to zero. Secondly, we already control 
for relative factor endowment (defined as the GDP per capita differential), and this 
variable is likely to already capture part of the variation in wages. 
In summary, the results from table 2 offer support to the hypothesis that the energy 
price gap has a positive and significant effect on bilateral trade. In other words, 
imports in sector s increase in response to the rise in energy prices in the importing 
country relative to the exporting country. In terms of magnitudes, our results 
suggest that a 10% increase in the importer’s energy price relative to the exporter is 
associated with a 0.2% increase in imports. 
Thus, this effect is statistically significant but very small. We return to this point in 
Section 4.3.. 
4.2 Examining sector heterogeneity 
The results presented in section 4.1 present the average impact of energy price 
differences on imports across all sectors. However, it is likely that this impact differs 
across sectors depending on their energy intensity. The importance of sector 
heterogeneity in the trade impacts of carbon pricing has been explored in partial 
equilibrium modelling for Europe’s heavy industry, as well as in econometric 
analysis for the EU production sectors (Demailly & Quirion, 2008). This section 
examines whether similar evidence can be found for a wider geographical scope, 
taking advantage of the fact that our energy price variable epgapijst captures 
variations in energy prices not only across country-pairs but also across sectors. In 
order to explore the heterogeneity of the impact of energy prices on imports we run 
the model separately for energy intensive and non-energy intensive sectors. We 
divided the sectors into energy intensive and non-energy intensive using data on 
real unit energy costs (RUEC) from the EU27 group in 2009 (European Commission, 
2014), defined as the ratio of energy costs over value added. Energy intensive 
sectors are those whose ratio of energy costs over value added exceeds 10%. The 
list of sectors considered as energy-intensive and non-energy intensive is available 
in Table 8 in Appendix B. 
The results of our estimations are presented in Table 3. The results give support to 
the notion that the impacts of the energy price gap on trade are heterogeneous 
across sectors depending on their energy intensity. The coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant for both energy-intensive and non-energy intensive sectors.  
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Table 3: Results by sector groups 
 
Notes: *,**,***= significant at 10,% 5%, 1%. . Standard errors clustered at the country 
pair level in parentheses. The dependent variable is the value of annual bilateral imports. 
Estimation is by Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood. The country-pair-sector fixed 
effect is a pre-sample mean of the dependent variable over the years 1996-2000. All 
regressions include controls for wage differences, real effective exchange rates ratio, 
relative factor endowments, overall economic size of the two trading partners, GDP 
similarity, population weighted distance between trading partners, and dummies for 
common currency, contiguity and common official language. All regressions include 
dummies for years, importer, exporter and sectors. 
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However, the effect is larger for energy-intensive sectors with an elasticity of 0.024. 
This is around 50% higher than in non-energy intensive sectors (0.017) and larger 
than the average impact uncovered in section 4.1 but still fairly small.12  
4.3 Magnitude of the effect 
To obtain a better sense of the magnitude of the results, in this section we 
investigate how much of the overall variation in sectoral bilateral trade is explained 
by energy price differences. We start by a simple example. Between 2005 and 2006, 
India’s iron and steel sector’s real energy price index increased from from 5.03 to 
5.09. Over the same period, the real energy price index for the same sector in the UK 
increased from 5.61 to 5.71. This implies that over this period the energy price gap 
between the UK and India’s steel sector increased by 4%13. 
In section 4.2 we found that a 1% increase in the energy price gap in the heavy 
industry sector was associated with a 0.027% increase in imports. Thus a 4% 
increase in the price gap between the UK and India is predicted to increase UK’s 
imports in this sector by around 0.1%. However during the same period, India’s iron 
and steel exports to the UK actually grew by 33%. The energy price gap is therefore 
explaining 0.3% of the observed change in trade volumes. 
This example illustrates the small contribution of the variation in energy prices in 
the overall variation in trade flows in the iron and steel sector. We now generalise 
this example and analyse the contribution of energy price changes to the overall 
variance in bilateral trade flows for the two broad sector categories – heavy- and 
light-industry. To do so we calculate the change in trade flows predicted by our 
                                                        
12 Ideally, one would want to collect data on the energy intensity of sectors, interact the energy 
intensity variable with the energy price variable and directly look at the coefficient obtained for the 
interaction term, which measures how the impact of the energy price varies according to the energy 
intensity of the sector. The quality of the data is not as good as one would hope, however, for two 
reasons: first, the RUEC data is only available at a broad level of sector disaggregation (14 sectors, 
compared to the 60+ sectors we have in our sample) and secondly, the variation in energy costs is 
partly driven by changes in energy prices, which raises endogeneity concerns, when one would want 
to use energy intensity. When we include real unit energy costs (grouping sectors into 14 groups) as 
well as an interaction term between energy prices and unit energy costs in our baseline model, we 
find that the RUEC term enters as positive and highly significant, with a value 0.0045*** (p-value = 
0.000). The coefficient on the energy price gap is 0.016***. The interaction term has a positive sign 
(0.00048) but is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.129). These results go in the expected 
direction, but the lack of variation and the fact that energy prices enter into the construction of the 
energy costs can explain the lack of clear statistical significance. We have unfortunately not been able 
to obtain better, more disaggregated sector energy intensity data to improve this estimation. This 
data gap is a prevalent problem in the literature as discussed in Upadhyaya (2010). Other papers 
have used electricity intensity of sectors to proxy for energy intensity but this method is unsuitable 
for this analysis, as the energy price variable we use accounts for all major fuel types and not only 
electricity. 
13 exp(5.71 5.61)/exp(5.09 5.03) = 1.04. Recall that the energy price gap is defined as epgapijst 
=ln − ln = ln	(


) 
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model and compare this to the observed change in trade flow for each observation 
in our sample. The contribution of energy prices to the variance of trade flows 
across these sectors is extremely small – around 0.01% for the heavy industry 
sectors, and even smaller for light industry. This is also clear from the observation 
that for any particular sector, the country with the lowest energy price among all 
those trading with that country is not always a net importer. Therefore, energy 
prices do not appear to be a major determinant of trade patterns. This shows that 
other explanatory factors, such as underlying trends in transport costs, globalisation 
and supply chain integration, population growth and economic growth play a much 
more important role in the variation in trade over time than do energy costs. 
4.4 Robustness checks 
We conducted a large number of robustness checks and report the main ones below. 
Alternative estimators: As explained in section 2.3, the pre-sample mean Poisson 
pseudo- maximum likelihood estimator is our preferred estimator, as it is able to 
address the key characteristics of the data – the combination of fixed effects with 
lagged dependent variables, the skewed distribution of the dependent variable and 
the large number of dummy variables. However, we also analyse the sensitivity of 
our results to the use of alternative models, in line with the recent gravity model 
trade literature (Gómez-Herrera, 2013). In column (2) of Table 4, we use the 
Hausman, Hall and Griliches (HHG) method to account for country- pair-sector fixed 
effects, even though the assumption of strict exogeneity underlying HHG is 
problematic in our context, as we have a highly dynamic specification. The 
coefficient is still highly statistically significant and higher than in our baseline 
model (but not statistically significantly so). In column (3), we reproduce the same 
specification as in column (4) of Table 2 (also reproduced in column 1 of Table 4) 
but use a negative binomial estimator instead, which might be better able to handle 
the large overdispersion of the dependent variable. The coefficient is smaller but in 
line with our baseline model. 
Fixed effects specification: Baltagi et al. (2003) experiment with eight different 
fixed effects models and show the importance of controlling for a full interaction of 
importer-time and exporter-time fixed effects to analyse bilateral trade flows and 
thus purge the estimates from a large number of possible confounding factors. In 
column (4), importer by year and exporter by year fixed effects )it and )jt are 
included to control for common macroeconomic shocks at the country level, such as 
the sharp fall in global trade volumes following the financial crisis in 2008 which 
may have differently affected countries around the world. We find that the 
coefficient is smaller than the baseline specification, suggesting that if anything the 
already small elasticity of trade to energy prices might even be slightly 
overestimated. 
Energy price changes in third countries: From a general equilibrium point of 
view, trade between i and j might also be affected by changes in prices in other  
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis results 1 
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Notes: *,**,***= significant at 10,% 5%, 1%. The dependent variable is the annual 
bilateral imports expressed in value terms. Standard errors clustered at the country pair 
level in parentheses. Estimation is by PPML , with two exceptions. Column (2) uses 
Poisson fixed effects and column (3) uses negative binomial. All regressions include 
controls for wage differences, real effective exchange rates ratio, relative factor 
endowments, overall economic size of the two trading partners and GDP similarity. 
Gravity variables are included in all columns except (2), which include the population 
weighted distance between the trading partners, and dummies for common currency, 
contiguity and common official language. Column (2) uses country-pair-sector fixed 
effects, while other columns use a pre-sample mean. All regressions include year 
dummies, except column (4) which uses importer-year and exporter-year dummies. 
Importer and exporter dummies and sectors dummies are included in all columns other 
than (2) and (4). 
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis results 2 
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Notes: *,**,***= significant at 10,% 5%, 1%. The dependent variable is the annual 
bilateral imports expressed in value terms. Standard errors clustered at the country pair 
level in parentheses. Estimation is by PPML. All regressions include controls for wage 
differences, real effective exchange rates ratio, relative factor endowments, overall 
economic size of the two trading partners, GDP similarity, year dummies, the population 
weighted distance between the trading partners, and dummies for common currency, 
contiguity and common official language. All regressions include year dummies, importer 
and exporter dummies and sectors dummies. 
 
 
 
countries k. Indeed, a change in energy prices in country k will indirectly affect trade 
between i and j through a redirection of trade between i and k and j and k, so that 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
trade between i and j will be substituted with trade with other countries. The 
inclusion of importer-by-year and exporter- by-year fixed effects reported above 
would control for this issue to a large extent, but in order to directly control for 
changes in relative prices with other trading partners, we include a variable that 
measures, for any country-pair i j, sector s and time t, the energy price gap between 
country i and all countries k other than j. We construct the average price gap 
between i and third countries k by weighing the price in country k by the value of 
imports by i from k in year t-1 (to capture the idea that substitution is more likely to 
occur with countries that already have a trade relationship with i). We report the 
results of this test in column (7) of table 5. The price gap with third countries enters 
with a negative but not significant coefficient. Importantly, our main variable of 
interest, the price gap variable, remains highly statistically significant with a point 
estimate of 0.019. This suggests that not controlling for energy price changes in 
third countries might actually bias the coefficient downward. 
Lagged dependent variable selection: As explained in Section 2.1, we 
experimented with various dynamic specifications. Columns (5), (6) and (7) in Table 
4 show the results of our baseline specification when including respectively one, 
two and four lags of the dependent variable. The results are remarkably stable 
across these various specifications. 
Specification of the energy price gap: To test the possibility that the estimated 
effects are sensitive to the specification of the energy price gap variable, we used 
different time period to construct the energy mix weights underlying the variable. 
We use weights based on a pre-sample period in Table 5 column (1) and weights 
based on 2010 in column (2). None of these variants of the price variable change the 
results substantially. We also run the regression with the energy price index which 
uses time-varying weights, rather than fixed weights, as shown in column (3). An 
advantage of fixing the weights for the entire period is that all the variation in the 
price gap variable comes from changes in energy prices and not from changes in the 
energy mix, which makes the interpretation of the results more straightforward. 
However, this abstracts from the fact that companies may react to changes in energy 
prices by changing the energy mix they use. When we construct the energy price 
variable using time-varying weights, the results still hold and the coefficient on the 
energy price gap is slightly smaller (0.0169**) than in the reference model. This 
suggests that sectors indeed switch towards cheaper fuels over time. 
Energy price dynamics: Table 5 reports alternative dynamic specifications for the 
energy price gap variable. We use energy prices dated in the current year in column 
(4), lagged one year in our (baseline) of column (5) and lagged two years in column 
6). Using contemporaneous prices returns very similar results to the lagged price, 
but the coefficient on energy prices in year t 2 is not statistically significant. This 
suggests that the reaction of trade to changes in relative energy prices is quick. 
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5 Simulating the trade impacts of carbon pricing policies 
In this section we explore the implications of our econometric models for the 
evolution of future trade flows and how these may be affected by asymmetric 
changes in the price of energy implied by unequal carbon pricing policies. Few 
meaningful carbon prices were in place during the time period covered in the data, 
so that energy price variations have thus far been mostly driven by factors other 
than climate policies. However, it is likely that the threats posed by climate change 
will require carbon emissions regulations that lie far outside the bounds of past 
experience. For example, as part of the “2030 framework for climate and energy 
policies”, the European Union has committed itself to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least 40% in 2030 compared to 1990. The “Roadmap for moving to a 
low-carbon economy” further suggests that, by 2050, the EU should cut its 
emissions to 80% below 1990 levels. 
Large industrial energy users in the EU have been regulated under the EU Emissions 
Trading System since 2005. During the period 2005-2011, the average carbon price 
was around €14.5/tCO2.
14 The 40% greenhouse gas emissions reductions target for 
2030 implies considerably higher prices on the European carbon market than the 
ones observed between 2005-2011. According to Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, 
the price of carbon should reach €65/tCO2 in 2030, which corresponds to a 
€50/tCO2 increase from the average 2005-2011 level. Further carbon emissions 
reductions in line with 2050 targets are likely to push the price up above the 
€100/tCO2 level. Given the large uncertainty around the energy price increase from 
carbon pricing, we simulate two scenarios whereby energy prices were 10% and 
30% higher throughout Europe than was actually observed. This implies that the 
average EU ETS carbon price would have been higher by 25-€50/tCO2 for the 10% 
energy price increase scenario, and by €50-100/tCO2 for the 30% scenario, 
assuming no free allowance allocation (thus the EU sectors face the full impact of 
carbon pricing) according to a recent study by the UK Department of Energy and 
Climate Change15 (UK Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2011). Using our 
                                                        
14 The average annual EUA price in Phase I was €22 .3 /tCO2e (2005), €15.1 /tCO2e (2006), 
€1.3 /tCO2e (2007), and €15.5/tCO2 in Phase II (2008-2012). 
15 15The study conducted by the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change estimates that 
the average impact of all energy and climate change policies on business energy (gas & 
electricity) bills, including UK policies and the EU ETS, compared with bills in the absence of 
policies for large energy intensive users is between 6-36% assuming a 30GBP/tCO2 EU ETS 
price in 2020 (DECC, 2011). Energy price impacts are likely to vary considerably according to the 
energy profile of users (e.g. gas intensive or electricity intensive) as well as model assumptions. 
Of this estimated range of impacts, a third is attributable to the EU ETS, and two thirds to other 
climate policies such as the Renewables Obligations support costs. Hence the energy price 
increase attributable to the EU ETS with 30GBP/tCO2is between 2 - 12% compared to the case 
with no EU ETS. Using average exchange rate between 2005-2011, 30GBP/tCO2is 
approximated at €35/tCO2. Instead with a carbon price assumption of 70GBP/tCO2, the same 
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econometric model, we simulate the impact of a 10% and a 30% increase in energy 
prices across Europe on the EU’s imports and exports, assuming no change in 
energy prices in the rest of the world. Applying this range of energy price increases 
induces a significant change in the size of the energy price gap between the EU and 
its trading partners. Table 6 presents the predicted impacts on Europe’s imports 
and exports16. EU imports are predicted to increase by 0.04% following a 10% 
increase in energy prices (corresponding to a 40-65 /tCO2 price) and by 0.07 % 
following a 30% increase in energy prices (corresponding to a € 
65-115 /tCO2 price). Exports are predicted to decline by 
Table 6: Predicted impact of EU ETS carbon prices on EU imports and exports 
 
0.2% to 0.5%.16 To put things into perspective, consider that imports to European 
countries have grown at an average annual rate of 6.5% between 1995 and 2011 
and at the rate of 15.6% since 2009. Hence, the impact of ambitious unilateral 
climate change mitigation policies in Europe on trade appears limited. Our estimates 
are smaller but comparable to the study by Aldy & Pizer (2011) which finds that an 
8% increase in the US electricity prices would lead to an approximately 1% decline 
in net trade. 
6 Conclusion 
As countries strengthen carbon pricing policies at different speeds, there is 
considerable interest around the potential trade impacts particularly for the energy 
intensive trade-exposed sectors. This paper measures the response of bilateral trade 
to differences in industrial energy prices, using a 16 year panel dataset that includes 
42 countries and 62 sectors (covering 80% of global merchandise trade). The 
coverage and detailed disaggregation of the data used goes well beyond previous 
work, allowing the first global ex-post analysis of the relationship between trade 
and energy prices. 
We find evidence that changes to the relative energy price between countries have a 
statistically significant impact on bilateral trade. This result is robust to various 
estimation techniques and to a wide number of sensitivity tests. The magnitude of 
this effect, however, is small. A 10% increase in the price of energy in the importer 
                                                                                                                                                                     
study predicts industry energy price rise of between 13-60%, the third of which is attributable to 
the EU ETS (4-20%). 
16 We assume that the impact of the carbon price on energy prices is similar in all European 
countries, hence intra-EU trade is not affected. 
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country relative to the exporter country increases imports by around 0.2%. Though 
slightly larger, the effect remains small in heavy industries, suggesting that trade in 
energy-intensive sectors may be more resilient to higher energy prices than 
previously thought. 
The findings in this paper suggest that the concerns around short-term impacts on 
carbon leakage and competitiveness are not entirely ungrounded, but that such 
concerns may have been overstated, so that concerns around carbon leakage and 
competitiveness need not dictate the design of carbon mitigation policy instruments. 
Importantly, the elasticities obtained in this study can be interpreted in a broader 
geographical context compared to previous studies which examined only 
industrialised countries. This is important, because carbon pricing policies are being 
implemented across the world, and carbon leakage is no longer a rich nation’s 
problem. For example, carbon leakage concerns have been raised following China’s 
pledge to achieve significant GDP energy intensity reduction targets largely through 
changes in sectoral composition of GDP (Tekes, 2011). The estimations from this 
study predict that changes of production do not imply large changes in trade 
patterns, at least in the short-term. 
An important limitation of our study is that by definition, ex-post empirical 
evaluations can only cover past or existing policies, but the possibility of larger 
effects on trade in the future cannot be ruled out if efforts in pollution control 
diverge significantly across countries. There are stark divergences in the political 
will to tackle climate change among developed countries’ governments, as 
exemplified by Australia’s decision to abolish carbon taxes in 2014 and Germany’s 
ambitious energy transition programme (Energiewende) which aims to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95 percent by 2050. The regulatory gap might also 
increase between some emerging economies such as China, Brazil, South Korea, 
Malaysia and India, which all play a key role in trade and global supply chains. Our 
results might not be valid for much larger energy price differences across countries 
than those observed over the last decades. 
A key issue for future research is thus to improve the identification of specific 
economic activities where pollution leakage and competitiveness issues represent a 
genuine risk; for these specific activities, to assess the various policy options 
available to prevent adverse impacts on trade whilst avoiding the creation of new 
distortions; and to determine how environmental policies should be adjusted as 
other countries’ regulations evolve. To carry out these analyses, more disaggregated 
data on energy prices faced by sectors is necessary. The sectoral level variation in 
the energy price data used in this paper is estimated using variation in energy mix 
across sectors, but actual energy prices faced by sectors might vary because of 
different degrees of competition or the types of contracts used in the industry. As 
more detailed data become available, incorporating this variation into the analysis 
will likely enable more robust estimations at the sector level. The availability of 
better energy intensity data with variation at the country, sector and time level will 
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also allow for additional explorations of how the impact of energy prices on trade 
varies with energy intensity at the sector level. 
It would also be interesting to use the results from this paper to estimate the 
impacts that fossil fuel subsidy removals might have on trade. The removal of fossil 
subsidies are likely to impact the price of fossil fuels, as has been modelled by 
Schwanitz et al. (2014). However, the information needed to estimate the impact of 
fossil fuel subsidy removal on energy prices implies a level of disaggregation of 
subsidies (by fuel type, sector and country) that, to the best of our knowledge, is not 
yet available. We hope that improved understanding of the effects of fossil subsidies 
removal on energy prices will in the future enable us to pursue this question. 
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Appendix A 
Sato et al. (2015) construct an energy price index for a given sector s in country i , by 
weighting fuel prices for four carriers (oil, gas, coal and electricity) by the 
consumption of each fuel type in that sector-country (si). While an average 
industrial energy price level (for all industrial sectors) are readily available for main 
fuel types, sector specific energy price data is more difficult to obtain for a large 
panel with many countries. The construction of sector-level prices using fuel 
consumption as weights then addresses the important issue of heterogenous fuel 
mix observed across sectors and countries, and is preferable to using the average 
industry energy price. Sato et al. (2015) constructs two sector level energy price 
series: the Fixed Weight energy Price Level (FEPI) uses fixed weights, whereas the 
Variable Weight energy Price Level (VEPL) uses fuel weights which vary over time. 
The former is an index, which aims to capture the within-sector variation, of the 
change in energy price level over time for a specific country-sector. The FEPI is 
intended to capture only energy price changes that come from changes in fuel prices, 
and not through changes in the mix of fuel inputs. It is suitable for use in time-series 
and panel data analysis and is used in this analysis. The latter is instead designed to 
capture the between-sector variation in energy prices, thus reflecting the effective 
energy price level (including tax and other policies) for each sector at a particular 
point in time. This makes it suitable for cross-sectional analysis and is used in this 
analysis in the robustness check, to test how allowing for changes in the mix of fuel 
inputs impacts results. 
The fixed-weight price index is constructed for each available country i, sector s and 
year t, according to the following equation: 
 
*+% = ∑ 	
∑ 

	
	
∙ 	( ) = ∑  ∙ 	()   (2) 
 
where *  are the input quantity of fuel type j in tons of oil equivalent (TOE) for 
sector s in country i and denotes the real TOE price of fuel type j for total 
manufacturing in country i at time t in constant 2010 USD. The weights,  , applied 
to fuel prices are fixed over time. The prices  , are transformed into logs before 
applying the weights so that the log of the individual prices enter linearly in the 
equation. Within any one country-sector, a consistent set of sub-fuel type is used 
through time. Anchor years for the fixed weights are taken at 1995, 2000, 2005 and 
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2010, and the 2005 one is used in the reference model, and we also test in the 
robustness section, how the results compare using energy prices using weights fixed 
at 2000 and 2010 levels. 
Appendix B 
Table 7: List of countries and sectors 
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Table 8: Broad sectors groups 
 
